As Gencos are responsible for providing active and reactive power generation, they should devise good bidding strategies for energy and reactive power market. The paper describes a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained Gencos with incomplete information. The proposed methodology employs the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) for modeling a Genco's bidding strategy in energy market and uses Expected Payment Function (EPF) to construct a bidding framework in the reactive power market. The problem of finding the optimum strategy of Gencos is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem, where the upper sub-problem represents individual Genco's payoff and the lower sub-problem solves the ISO's market clearing problem. The ISO's market clearing model is modified with applying generator Active Participation Factors to improve the voltage stability margin. The IEEE 39 bus test system is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.