Long term energy auctions are positioning as a valuable tool in order to attract new investments into power systems, especially in Latin American countries where emergent economies characteristics and their correspondent risks are usually present. Even though the focus of these auctions is the long term, there are short term issues involved which actual auction designs fail to include, resulting in an energy allocation that is not necessarily optimal for the system, a condition which becomes more evident in the presence of intermittent renewable technologies. A novel mechanism is formulated to obtain the optimal allocation in long term energy auctions, considering short term generation profiles from both intermittent and conventional base load technologies, and also their risk aversions. The proposed mechanism is developed and simulations are made for some scenarios in the Chilean power market, with different levels of renewable penetration. Significant cost savings are achieved for the final consumers in relation to energy purchases, in comparison with a mechanism that follows the demand profile. As more renewable intermittent capacity enters the power system it is evident the need for changes in the energy auctions allocation mechanisms, including elements to exploit the synergies among participants in the short term.