In 2004, the Korean Government suspended its electricity market reform based on the two-thirds majority recommendation of a six-member joint study team. This suspension effectively interrupts the basic plan adopted in 1998 by the previous administration to divest and privatize Korea Electric Power Corporation's (KEPCO's) generation segment in 2000-2002, implement transmission open access and wholesale competition by 2008, and introduce retail competition thereafter. This policy-decision followed the controversial debate on electricity market reform in Korea. Reform proponents claim that electricity can be treated as ordinary goods exchangeable in the competitive market, and any problems caused by the transition to the market system are manageable. By contrast, reform opponents argue that effective competition of the power industry is not yet feasible due to the idiosyncratic nature of electricity (e.g., low-price elasticity of demand and not being storable at low cost) as well as the country's isolated electricity network. In suspending the electricity reform, the current administration accepted the final conclusion of the joint study team in the Tripartite Commission on the ground that the alleged benefits of reform are theoretical and uncertain, while the real costs and risks are substantial. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.